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Abstract Consuming a product does not (necessarily) reveal the environmental dam-
age it may cause. In terms of environmental damage, most goods are credence goods.
Therefore, advertising and pricing rarely can transmit such information effectively to
consumers. This article considers the scope with which an environmental group (EG)
can signal this information to consumers via advertising and campaigning. Although
an EG can inform the public, the welfare effects are ambiguous. Therefore, the EG
may not have an incentive to acquire information about the firm’s production prac-
tices. However, when the firm chooses the level of environmental damage and the
EG chooses whether to acquire information, there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium
for some parameter values, such that the EG acquires information, and the threat of
advertising causes the firm to produce an environmentally friendly good.
Keywords Environmental group · Environmental quality · Monopoly · Informative
advertising · Asymmetric information · Information acquisition
JEL Classification L12 · L30 · Q50
1 Introduction
Consuming a product does not necessarily reveal its environmental quality. If con-
sumers care about the environmental quality of the good (and there is evidence that
they do; Kuhn 2005), then how does this information get transmitted to consumers?1
1 Environmental quality is a credence good. See Darby and Karni (1973) and Emons (1997, 2001).
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Three possible groups could provide this information: the firm that sells the good,
the government, and environmental groups (i.e., a non-governmental organization that
aims to improve the state of the environment). Starting with the firm, Mahenc (2007,
2008) demonstrates under which conditions a firm can use the price of a good to signal
environmental quality. In this case, the marginal cost of producing a good should be
increasing with its environmental quality, and the firm’s profit should be increasing
with consumers’ perception of environmental quality. Another instrument at the firm’s
disposal is ecolabeling, which Ibanez and Grolleau (2008) show firms can use to
inform consumers. Government-firm interactions also have been studied extensively.
For example, Maxwell et al. (2000) study the effect of (future) mandatory pollution
regulation, Amacher et al. (2004) provide a theoretical analysis of ecolabeling, and
Petrakis et al. (2005) examine information provision as a public policy instrument.
In contrast, the role of environmental groups (EGs) as information providers has not
received much attention. Most literature considers how EGs influence the behavior of
firms, such as through the effects of boycotts (Baron 2003; Innes 2006) or the threat of
boycotts (Diermeier and Baron 2007). This focus has neglected the myriad of activities
that EGs engage in. In particular, EGs communicate with consumers in various ways,
such as through advertisements or encouraging media coverage of their own activities
(see Baron 2005). EGs generally try not only to persuade the consumer to adopt the
organization’s viewpoint, but also to provide facts and information that the consumer
may not have been aware of.
As an example, consider the ‘Viswijzer’ (Dutch for fish guide) advertising cam-
paign which features as its centerpiece an informative brochure that tells consumers
which fish are on the brink of extinction, such that they may avoid consuming those
species. Extensive advertising on Dutch television by the World Wildlife Fund pro-
motes the informative brochure.2 However, the product itself (i.e., the fish) does not
display this kind of information, which means that this campaign is clearly distinct
from (eco)labeling. Another example falls under a somewhat broader definition of
advertising, namely Greenpeace’s attempt to inform consumers about toxic ingredient
in Disney branded pajamas.3 The strategy that this EG used was to (illegally) attach
labels to pajamas, warning the consumers of the toxins present. This kind of guerilla
advertising is clearly distinct from the conventional definition of labeling, in that the
action is neither sanctioned by Disney nor are there any controls over the accuracy of
the label. In both these examples, the visible activities by the EG require time, effort,
and money. Therefore, the EG can use such instruments to signal the severity of the
situation.
To model this phenomenon, I extend the standard industrial organization framework
of vertical product differentiation to environmental damage and asymmetric informa-
tion about that damage (i.e., consumers are unaware of the level of damage). I first
consider a case in which the firm cannot signal the level of damage through price or
2 This information, written in Dutch, can be found at www.wnf.nl, under Natuurbescherming/
Campagnes/Leven in de zee 2006/Viswijzer/. All available fish guides can be found at http://wwf.
panda.org/what_we_do/how_we_work/conservation/marine/sustainable_fishing/sustainable_seafood/
seafood_guides/; South Africa and Switzerland offer English language versions.
3 See www.greenpeace.org.uk.
123
Informative advertising by an environmental group 251
advertising (by assuming that marginal costs are independent of the damage level).
I then introduce an EG that might choose to advertise with a certain intensity. The
analysis reveals that the EG can signal the level of damage through its advertising.
The EG chooses to advertise if a firm is producing a good with a high level of damage.
Advertising harms “bad” firms instead of praising “good” ones.4 Ex ante advertising
benefits both the firm and the consumers. Although in this respect information trans-
mission by the EG is useful, I show that from an ex ante perspective, the EG itself does
not necessarily benefit. Even if I drop the assumption that marginal cost is independent
of damage level, the conclusions do not qualitatively change, though this extension
does identify when the EG is more efficient at signaling than the firm, namely, when
environmental problems are not severe. Finally, I consider a variant of this model, in
which environmental damage is chosen by the firm, and information acquisition by
the EG is endogenized. Under certain conditions, there exists an equilibrium where
the firm randomizes between low and high damage and the EG acquires information
(with positive probability). The EG advertises if it acquires information and the firm
chooses high damage. Therefore in all three specifications I investigate, advertising
campaigns by the EG occur in equilibrium.
My approach is related to several strands of the literature. First, the informative
advertising model I propose relates to the auditing model presented by Feddersen and
Gilligan (2001), who study a duopoly situation in which firms are price-takers. In
their model, the EG can investigate a firm and discover how damaging the production
process is, and then transmit this information to consumers. However, Feddersen and
Gilligan suppose that information must be gathered, whereas I propose that informa-
tion primarily needs to be disseminated. Both approaches emphasize the difficulty the
EG faces when it tries to convince the public. Because Feddersen and Gilligan study
costless investigations, their model relies on the concept of cheap talk to transmit infor-
mation. The possibility of cheap talk represents an artifact of their model. Crawford
and Sobel (1982) investigate the conditions under which an informative equilibrium
arises in general cheap talk games and conclude that though such an equilibrium can
exist, it is only possible if the disagreement between the receiver and the sender is
not too large. Applied to the situation here, though the EG and consumer may agree
that low environmental damage is preferable, consumers also want to keep price as
low as possible. Feddersen and Gilligan eliminate this factor by making the firms
price-takers.
Second, Baron (2005) examines a situation in which EGs (and firms) cannot directly
communicate with consumers: All information is dispersed through the news media.
The results indicate that the media are biased and the EG has an incentive to conceal
information that is unfavorable to its interests. I study direct communication between
4 Diermeier and Baron (2007) assume that EGs hurt bad firms. In the model presented here this follows
directly from the incentive constraints of the EG. But because there are examples of positive advertising by
EGs, this focus tells only part of the story. For example, the ‘Viswijzer’ not only indicates which fish to avoid,
but also suggests alternatives. Greenpeace has advertised in favor of the CFC-free refrigerator Greenfreeze,
originally produced by a small German company and later adopted by mainstream manufacturers. However,




EGs and consumers instead and show that there are situations in which the EG would
like to conceal information.
Third, the model I propose is similar to the model used in Heijnen and Schoonbeek
(2008), but they study persuasive advertising. In their model, consumers are aware
of the level of environmental damage, and the EG uses advertising to increase the
marginal disutility it causes to consumers. In equilibrium, firms preempt the EG’s
advertising campaign by producing a cleaner good. In the final variant of my model
in which firms can choose the level of environmental damage, I observe preemption
(to some degree) as well.
Fourth, my approach relates to the theoretical industrial organization literature
where prices and advertising signal product quality (Bagwell and Ramey 1988;
Milgrom and Roberts 1986). Bagwell and Ramey (1991) and Hertzendorf and Over-
gaard (2001) also address the case of two competing senders of information, similar to
the model presented here.5 However, their senders are two firms, whereas I investigate
a firm and an EG as senders. In turn, this research contributes to the signaling literature
by investigating signaling by an outsider, namely, the EG that becomes informed and
may benefit from passing this information on to consumers.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: Sect. 2 introduces the model.
Then in Sect. 3, I present the equilibria of the model, before outlining the results
in Sect. 4, including the effect of advertising on the EG, the firm, and consumers.
Section 5 introduces differences in marginal costs, and then I consider endogenous
information acquisition in Sect. 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
Consider a market in which a single, profit-maximizing firm sells one good. This good
is characterized by the damage d it causes to the environment per product sold. Ex
ante with probability ρ, damage is low, d = dL , and with probability 1−ρ, damage is
high, d = dH . Assume that 0 < dL < dH and 0 < ρ < 1. The firm and the EG know
the true value of d, but consumers, who care about the damage the product causes,
only know the distribution of d. The price of the good is p.
In the short run, the production technology is fixed. Irrespective of d, it costs c > 0
to produce one unit of the good. Usually, marginal cost is assumed to be decreas-
ing in damage level. By abstracting from this, I focus purely on the communication
problem. As a consequence of this assumption, the firm’s profit level does not depend
on the true value of d. Therefore the single crossing property, a necessary condition
for the existence of an equilibrium in which the firm signals its type with the price of
the product, cannot hold. The firm cannot convince consumers that it is a low damage
firm (cf. Mahenc 2008).
5 Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) consider a case with an infinite number of senders of information and
find that signaling through advertising is possible in this case, but only if the high quality good has lower
marginal costs ‘on average’. Although the Porter hypothesis (Porter and van den Linde 1995), which states
that environmentally friendly goods are cheaper to produce, has received a lot of attention, practically all
studies assume that environmentally friendly goods are more costly (Cremer and Thisse 1999; Mahenc 2008;
Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero 2002). The tentative conclusion is that more competitive markets
hamper the signaling of environmental damage by firms.
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Consumers are indexed by θ , where θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, θ¯ ].
Without loss of generality, let θ¯ = 1. Consumer θ has the following utility function:
U (θ, p) =
{
V − θμ − p if one unit of the good is bought and
0 if zero units are bought, (1)
where V > c is a positive constant, θ measures the disutility of environmental damage,
and μ is the expected (perceived) damage level associated with the consumption of one
unit of the good. This is the standard vertical differentiation model used for products
that differ in environmental quality (e.g. Cremer and Thisse 1999, Moraga-González
and Padrón-Fumero 2002).
Consumers individually have no impact on total environmental damage (i.e., dam-
age per product consumed times demand), but they have a lower utility if they buy a
good with higher perceived damage, due to the guilt associated with buying a dirtier
good. All consumers have the same information, which they process in the same man-
ner. After they have observed the actions of the firm and the EG, consumers have the
ex post belief that damage is low with a probability φ and μ = φdL + (1 − φ)dH .
If they receive no new information, then φ = ρ. The relation between φ and μ is
strictly decreasing, and utility is linear in expected damage. Therefore, there is no loss
of generality to consider only μ.
Only consumers with a sufficiently low θ will buy the good. The indifferent con-
sumer θˆ can be found by equating utility to zero:
θˆ = V − p
μ
. (2)
The demand for the good q(p, μ) is θˆ . I assume an interior solution: there are always
some consumers who do not buy the good because they care about the environment,
but there are also always some consumers who do buy the good. Therefore, demand
ranges between 0 and 1.
The profit of the firm is (p, μ) = q(p, μ)(p − c). It then can be easily verified






If consumers could observe the damage of the product, the price chosen by the firm
would be the optimal price, which does not depend on μ.6 Finally, observe that:
q(p∗, μ) = (V − c)
2μ
and (4)
6 This lack of dependency is a result of two assumptions. First, the marginal cost of producing the good
does not depend on d. Second, the lower boundary of the distribution of θ is 0. Therefore, even if the EG
signals environmental damage, the price that the firm sets will be completely uninformative in that both the
low damage firm and the high damage firm choose p∗ as the price.
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Therefore, demand and profit are decreasing in μ. Furthermore, both functions are
convex in μ.
Assume that an environmental group knows the true damage per product and cares
about the total environmental damage caused by the production of the good. The cost
of the environmental damage to the EG is q(p, μ)g, where g = gH if d = dH and
g = gL if d = dL . I assume gHgL ≥ dHdL .7 The EG and consumers agree that damage is
either high or low, but the EG reacts more strongly, because its dislike of high damage
is stronger than that of the consumers. Simultaneously with the firm’s price decision,
the EG can launch an advertising campaign, that consists of a message (“The firm
is of type d”) and has cost x . When advertising is observed by consumers, they are
able to infer the cost of the advertising campaign. For example, if consumers see an
advertisement run on prime-time television, they note that it must have cost the EG a
great deal of money. The cost of the advertising campaign is common knowledge.
The EG tries to minimize the sum of expected total damage and expected advertising
cost: q(p, μ)g+x . Note that demand q may depend indirectly on x through the beliefs
of consumers. For example, consumers might think that a costly advertising campaign
signals a dirty product and therefore update their expectations about the damage level
upward. The members of the EG are activists who never buy the product and are
willing to exert effort to determine how damaging the good really is. I assume that
the EG has ample funds to launch an advertising campaign, but also wants to spend
money as efficiently as possible. Therefore, the EG aims to minimize costs.
It is important to highlight that the actual message is not important, whereas the
cost of advertising is. It is not the objective of the EG to maximize consumers’ surplus.
The public’s skeptical view of the EG stems from non-alignment of the public interest
and the EG’s interest. The EG always benefits if consumers believe that the product is
more damaging, so consumers might not trust the EG. To simplify the analysis (and
without loss of generality), I assume that the advertising content is cheap talk, but that
by showing how much it is willing to spend, the EG can try to convince the public that
it is telling the truth.
The timing of the game is as follows:
Period 0: Nature draws the damage level per unit sold d.
Period 1: The firm and the EG observe d. The EG chooses the intensity of
advertising x . The firm chooses its price p.
Period 2: Consumers observe x and p. They update their beliefs μ (following Bayes’
rule whenever possible) and choose to buy the good or not, which results
in demand q(p, μ).
The equilibrium concept used is perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which has two main
requirements: The firm and the EG must choose optimal actions, given the beliefs of
consumers, and the consumers’ beliefs must be consistent with these actions. Whereas
7 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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most studies consider only one sender of information (cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1986),
here there are two senders (the firm and the EG).
2.1 Discussion of assumptions
Admittedly, the model presented here is simple. Specific functional forms simplify the
analysis, but the existence of separating and pooling equilibria can be derived under
more general conditions. Even if I allowed for a more general specification, the crucial
assumption in this model is that the marginal costs do not depend on the actual damage
of the firm. This assumption is not totally at odds with reality: the additional cost of
producing an environmentally friendly good may be largely sunk, such as the invest-
ment in plants and infrastructure or R& D costs.8 The merit of an assumption of equal
marginal cost is that in a full information setting, the price of the clean good and the
price of the dirty good will be the same. In the absence of price effects, the EG’s adver-
tising can then be discussed purely in terms of its informational effect. However, in
Sect. 5, I also consider the case in which marginal costs depend on the level of damage.
3 Equilibria
The forces that shape the set of equilibria are as follows. Intuitively, the EG wants to
convince consumers that damage per unit sold is high, but the firm wants the opposite.
If, in equilibrium, consumers believe that damage is low, then the cost of convincing
consumers that damage is high should be great enough to discourage the EG from
choosing this action. One way of ‘punishing’ a deviation by the EG is to assume that
the damage expected by consumers is sufficiently low. In contrast, the firm’s profit is at
its highest when consumers believe that it sells a low damage product, and deviations
by the firm are averted by assigning a sufficiently high expected damage level to these
deviations. Therefore, the beliefs that sustain an equilibrium assign low expected dam-
age levels to deviations from the EG and high expected damage levels to deviations
from the firm.
Two types of equilibria can be distinguished: separating and pooling. A separat-
ing equilibrium is one in which consumers can distinguish between each state of the
world, i.e., μ = dL if d = dL and μ = dH if d = dH . Because consumers must
be able to differentiate the two situations, (xL , pL) = (xH , pH ), where xL = x(dL),
xH = x(dH ), pL = p(dL), and pH = p(dH ) denote advertising levels and prices for
both states of the world.
In a game with two senders, the EG and the firm, there are two-sided separating equi-
libria (TSE) and one-sided separating equilibria (OSE). Bagwell and Ramey (1991)
define these concepts as follows: In a TSE, both senders emit state-contingent signals,
that is, xL = xH and pL = pH . In an OSE, only one sender emits a state-contingent
signal. There are two distinct OSE: one in which the firm signals (pL = pH and
xL = xH ) and one in which the EG signals (xL = xH and pL = pH ).
8 As an example, consider the development of a fuel-efficient engine. Designing the engine is costly, but
the production costs are unlikely to differ much.
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I am interested in the effect of advertising by EGs, so the OSE in which the EG
informs consumers is the obvious one to explore. Because the firm’s profit does not
depend on actual damage, the single crossing property is not satisfied for the firm, and
equilibria in which the firm signals do not exist. As a benchmark I use the case in which
it is impossible to advertise (i.e., xL = xH = 0), and the firm does not inform con-
sumers. Formally, this benchmark equilibrium coincides with a pooling equilibrium.
In the remainder of this article I use the notation μ(x, p) to denote the belief about
the expected value of d if consumers observe an advertising level of x and a price of p.
3.1 The benchmark
The benchmark of no advertising is a pooling equilibrium in which neither the firm
nor the EG provides the consumer with information. Consequently, in each state of
the world, they choose the same action. For the EG, I choose out of equilibrium
beliefs, such that the EG does not want to advertise, ∀x > 0 : μ(x, p) = dL . Hence
pL = pH = pˆ and xL = xH = 0. Then, μ(0, pˆ) = ρdL + (1 − ρ)dH ≡ μ¯. Con-
sider the incentives of the firm when profit does not depend on the true value of d. In
the pooling equilibrium, the constraint on out-of-equilibrium beliefs to rationalize the
firm’s action is:
(V − pˆ)( pˆ − c)
μ¯
≥ (V − p)(p − c)
μ(0, p)
for all p = pˆ, (6)
which can be rewritten as:
μ(0, p) ≥ (V − p)(p − c)
(V − pˆ)( pˆ − c) μ¯. (7)
If the RHS of (7) exceeds dH , then pˆ cannot be part of an equilibrium. If pˆ = p∗,
then the RHS is always smaller than or equal to μ¯ < dH . Thus, there is a pooling
equilibrium in which pˆ = p∗.
There are also other pooling equilibria. Suppose pˆ = p∗ and the deviation is p∗.
For pˆ to be part of an equilibrium, it must be that
(V − p∗)(p∗ − c)
(V − pˆ)( pˆ − c) μ¯ ≤ dH , (8)
i.e., the RHS of (7) should not exceed dH for the (most tempting) deviation p∗. Let
I be the interval for pˆ implied by (8). If pˆ ∈ I ⊂ [c, V ], it can be part of a pooling
equilibrium. Note that p∗ ∈ I and the equilibrium in which p = p∗ is the natural one
to select.9 Summarizing:
9 A formal refinement that selects this equilibrium is the notion of undefeated equilibrium. Both
types of firm prefer the equilibrium in which pL = pH = p∗. To quote Riley (2001, p. 451) “if an
out-of-equilibrium action is observed, the revised beliefs should be fully consistent with some other
equilibrium.” The notion of undefeated equilibrium requires μ(0, p∗) = μ¯. Suppose the price in the
pooling equilibrium is pˆ = p∗. In equilibrium, beliefs must be consistent, so we get μ(0, pˆ) = μ¯. Note that
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Proposition 1 (Benchmark) Given out-of-equilibrium beliefs μ(x, p) = dL for all
x > 0, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the firm sets its price equal to
p∗ in both states of the world and the EG never advertises.
3.2 Equilibrium with advertising
In an OSE in which the EG informs and the firm sets the same price in each state of the
world, beliefs must be such that μ(xL , pL) = dL and μ(xH , pH ) = dH . Moreover,
in this kind of equilibrium pL = pH . Specifically, the price that the firm will set must
be p∗ in both states of the world. Suppose, to the contrary, that pL = pH = pˆ = p∗.
For d = dH , the deviation to p∗ must not be profitable, and thus
(V − pˆ)( pˆ − c)
dH




Because pˆ = p∗, we know that (V − pˆ)( pˆ − c) < (V − p∗)(p∗ − c), in which
case it must be that dH < μ(xH , p∗), which is impossible. Hence pˆ = p∗. Take
μ(xH , p) = dH for all p = p∗. These out-of-equilibrium beliefs ensure that it is never
profitable for the firm to deviate from the equilibrium, because (V−p
∗)(p∗−c)
dH is the
minimal profit the firm receives in equilibrium as well as the supremum of profit it could
receive out-of-equilibrium. Similarly, μ(xL , p) = dH for all p = p∗ ensures that it
is never profitable for the firm to deviate if d = dL . Of course, these are extreme out-
of-equilibrium beliefs, and the equilibrium can be supported by more moderate ones.
In equilibrium, the EG determines xL from




gL + x (10)
if d = dL , and xH from




gH + x (11)
if d = dH . The aim is to find all xL and xH , with xL = xH , that for some μ(x, p∗)
satisfy (10) and (11).
Suppose d = dL and the EG deviates. What out-of-equilibrium beliefs are neces-
sary to sustain the equilibrium amount of advertising xL? It must be that
Footnote 9 continued
(V − pˆ)( pˆ − c)
μ(0, pˆ)
<
(V − p∗)(p∗ − c)
μ(0, p∗)
because p∗ maximizes (V − p)(p − c) and μ(0, pˆ) = μ(0, p∗) = μ¯. Therefore both types deviate to p∗
and the only equilibrium that survives this refinement is the one in which pL = pH = p∗. See Mailath





gL + x ≥ V − p
∗
dL
gL + xL for all x = xL . (12)
For x > xL , this inequality always holds if μ(x, p∗) = dL (i.e. μ(x, p∗) remains
low). This restriction implies that extra money spent on advertising is useless, because
consumers do not increase their expected damage levels. For x < xL , a necessary
condition is μ(x, p∗) < dL , which is impossible. To make this deviation unattractive,
consumers must believe that the product is cleaner than they know is possible. There-
fore, if xL > 0, the incentive compatibility constraint (12) cannot hold, and I conclude
that xL = 0. If the product is clean, the EG does not advertise.
Next, suppose that d = dH . Here the out-of-equilibrium beliefs must satisfy:
V − p∗
μ(x, p∗)
gH + x ≥ V − p
∗
dH
gH + xH for all x = xH . (13)
If x > xH , this inequality holds if μ(x, p∗) = dH . Again, the interpretation is that
if the extra cost does not increase the expected damage level, then for the EG, such a
deviation is not worthwhile. Let x < xH and rewrite (13) as:
μ(x, p∗) ≤ (V − p
∗)gH
(V − p∗)gH + (xH − x)dH dH . (14)
Note that the RHS is smaller than dH . However, without further restrictions, it might
also be smaller than dL , which should be impossible. The RHS is minimal at x = 0.





gH ≡ R, and we set μ(x, p∗) = dL
for x < xH (the worst belief for the EG), then the inequality in (14) is true. Thus,
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs that support the equilibrium under consideration are:
μ(x, p∗) = dL if x < xH and μ(x, p∗) = dH if x > xH . The EG is punished
severely if it advertises less than xH , and the beliefs ensure that it is never optimal to
advertise more than xH .
In equilibrium, xL = 0 and 0 < xH ≤ R, but there also is an additional restriction:
The EG must not be tempted to choose xH if d = dL and xL if d = dH . For the EG,
these incentive constraints imply:
V − p∗
dL
gL ≤ V − p
∗
dH
gL + xH if d = dL and (15)
V − p∗
dH
gH + xH ≤ V − p
∗
dL




















≡ [L , R] . (17)
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Observe that R > L > 0. In these OSE, the EG always advertises if d = dH . The cost
of advertising if the product is dirty must be sufficiently large; if the product is clean,
the benefits of campaigning are too small.
In summary, in these OSE, the firm no longer needs to inform consumers and
chooses its optimal price p∗. The EG now has to advertise with at least an intensity of
L if damage is high. So there are OSE in which xL = 0, xH ∈ [L , R], and pL = pH =
p∗. These equilibria are supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs in which, in the case
of deviations by the firm, perceived damage is high enough, and, in case of deviations
by the EG, perceived damage is low enough. The OSE in which xL = 0, xH = L , and
pL = pH = p∗ Pareto-dominates any other equilibrium of this type. Therefore I will
use this equilibrium with advertising as a comparison with the benchmark. Formally,
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium with advertising) There is a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium in which the EG does not advertise if damage is low and advertises with intensity
L > 0 if damage is high. The firm sets a price p∗ in both states of the world.
4 Comparison
In this section, I will compare the OSE with advertising with the benchmark of no
advertising. In particular, I will compare the ex ante cost of the EG and profit of the
firm. For the equilibrium with advertising, the ex ante expected total cost and profit are:
ads = ρ V − p
∗
dL
gL + (1 − ρ)V − p
∗
dH
gH + (1 − ρ)L , (18)
ads = ρ (V − p
∗)(p∗ − c)
dL




In the benchmark equilibrium, we have:
bench = V − p
∗
ρdL + (1 − ρ)dH (ρgL + (1 − ρ)gH ) (20)
and
bench = (V − p
∗)(p∗ − c)
ρdL + (1 − ρ)dH . (21)
Now we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Compared with the benchmark, the firm’s profit and consumers’ sur-
plus increase when the EG is allowed to advertise. However, the cost of the EG only
decreases if gLgH <
dL
dL+dH and ρ is sufficiently close to 1.
Proof The firm’s ex ante profit is always higher in the equilibrium with advertising than
in the benchmark equilibrium. Because profit is convex inμ, applying Jensen’s inequal-
ity to (19) and (21) yields the desired result. Regarding consumers’ surplus, in the case
of a linear demand function and a monopolistic firm, consumers’ surplus is exactly
half the monopoly profit. Ex ante, consumers also prefer the advertising equilibrium.
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Observe that ads ≤ bench can be rewritten as:
gL
dL
+ (1 − ρ)gH − gL
dH
≤ ρgL + (1 − ρ)gH
ρdL + (1 − ρ)dH
Divide both sides by gH and multiply by dH to obtain:
gˆ
dˆ
+ (1 − ρ)(1 − gˆ) ≤ ρ gˆ + (1 − ρ)
ρdˆ + (1 − ρ) ,
where gˆ = gL/gH and dˆ = dL/dH . Using the assumption that 0 ≤ gˆ ≤ dˆ, solving
for ρ yields:
ρ ≥ gˆ
dˆ(1 − gˆ) .
Because ρ ∈ [0, 1], the RHS of this inequality must be smaller than 1. It is easy to




The equilibrium with advertising could unambiguously raise welfare, but there
must be a discrepancy between the EG’s assessment of the environmental damage
and the consumers’. If this assessment is the same (gH/gL = dH/dL ), it is never
beneficial for the EG to engage in advertising. This claim is not surprising, because in
this case, on average and net of advertising cost, the EG is indifferent between having
informed or uninformed consumers. As the discrepancy increases, the cost to the EG
of misinformed consumers increases as well. At some point, that cost offsets the cost
of advertising.
5 Cost differences
For the reasons outlined previously, I began with the case in which both goods have
equal marginal costs. However, a common assumption in the literature is that the mar-
ginal cost of the low damage good exceeds the marginal cost of the high damage good.
In this section, I therefore explore the consequences of introducing cost differences.
This exercise provides a robustness check; to avoid notational cluttering, I focus solely
on the case in which gH = dH and gL = dL . Recall that in this case, the EG prefers
the benchmark over the equilibrium with advertising.
Let ci be the marginal cost of producing a good with damage level i = L , H .
Assume that cL > cH . With full information, the prices and profit levels, for the low-















cH and π∗H =
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In the absence of an EG, this version of the model is similar to the model of Mahenc
(2008). To obtain comparable results, I impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1 With full information, the firm prefers to sell the low damage good:
π∗L > π∗H .
I heuristically derive three equilibria for this game. The detailed derivations are
analogous to those in the previous sections and are available on request. The three
equilibria are
1. an OSE in which the firm signals,
2. a TSE in which the firm’s strategy is to use the full information prices,
3. the benchmark pooling equilibrium.
The choice of these equilibria is motivated by several considerations. First, I want
to determine if the welfare conclusions of Sect. 4 change qualitatively when cost
differences are introduced. A potential problem arises, because the equilibrium with
advertising was an OSE in which the firm used undistorted prices. These prices were
the same for low and high damage firms, whereas in this extension, the prices dif-
fer, and the equilibrium with advertising necessarily becomes a TSE. Therefore, the
derivation is a bit more involved. Second, because there are OSE in which the firm
signals (cf. Mahenc 2008), I can now determine who is more efficient at signaling
environmental quality; the EG or the firm.
5.1 Derivation of equilibria
5.1.1 OSE in which the firm signals
Because this is a separating equilibrium, there is no need for the EG to spend money on
advertising, and xL = xH = 0. The firm’s strategy is as follows: The bad type, which
is the high damage firm, plays an undistorted strategy with pH = p∗H .10 The good
type, which is the low damage firm, sets a price pL that makes mimicking unprofitable
for the high damage firm:
π∗H ≥
(V − pL)(pL − cH )
dL
. (24)
It is immediately evident that pL = p∗L , because substituting p∗L for pL yields, after
some manipulation,
−(cL − cH )(V − cL)
2dL
≥ π∗L − π∗H , (25)
where the LHS is negative and the RHS is positive by assumption. Hence we have
a contradiction and pL = p∗L . I take pL to be the smallest price, larger than p∗L ,
that satisfies (24). This equilibrium is the one that any reasonable refinement would
10 This is the well-known “no distortion at the bottom” result.
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select, namely, the least distorting signal with the property that the product with higher
marginal cost has a higher price. In summary,
Proposition 4 (OSE in which the firm signals) There is an OSE in which the firm
signals, such that pH = p∗H , and
pL =




∈ (p∗L , V ).
The EG does not advertise.
Proof The equilibrium has already been derived in the text. Appendix A contains the
derivation of pL . 
unionsq
5.1.2 TSE in which the firm’s strategy is to use full information prices
I explicitly look for TSE in which pL = p∗L and pH = p∗H , so that I can eventually
compare two extreme scenarios: one in which the EG bears all the cost of signaling
and one in which the firm bears all the cost (as derived in Sect. 5.1.1). Intuitively, the
EG bears all the cost if the firm uses undistorted prices. From the discussion in Sect. 3,
it is also obvious that xL = 0 and xH = xˆ > 0. The level of advertising, when damage
is high, is the only undetermined quantity.
The restrictions on xˆ derive fromμL H := μ(xL , pH ) andμH L := μ(xH , pL). Note
that these are the beliefs at (xL , pH ) = (0, p∗H ) and (xH , pL) = (xˆ, p∗L), respectively,
where the consumer does not know whether the firm or the EG has deviated from the
equilibrium strategy. Therefore, the beliefs at these points must simultaneously deter
the EG and the firm from deviating.
With regard to μL H , for the EG, the actual state of the world is high damage, and
the deviation is to zero advertising. The EG does not want to deviate if
V − p∗H
dH





For the firm, the actual state of the world is low damage, and the deviation is to p∗H .
This situation is never profitable, because the equilibrium strategy gives the firm the
highest possible profit. This restriction is as loose as possible if μL H = dL .
With regard to μH L , for the EG, the actual state of the world is low damage and
the deviation is to an advertising level of xˆ . Again, this should not be profitable:
V − p∗L
dL





For the firm the actual state of the world is high damage and the deviation is to p∗L .
This deviation could be profitable if it were accompanied by the belief that damage is
sufficiently low. Setting μH L = dH solves this problem. Note that (27) is satisfied as
well for this belief. Therefore, this belief simultaneously deters the EG and the firm
from deviating.
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From (26), it is possible to derive an upper bound on xˆ :







From (27) we obtain a lower bound on xˆ :






The upper bound should be larger than the lower bound. This implies






















which is clearly true. The TSE with the smallest advertising level is the one in which
xˆ equals the RHS of (29).
Proposition 5 (TSE with advertising) There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
which the EG does not advertise when the state of the world is low and advertises




when the state of the world is high. The firm uses
undistorted prices: pL = p∗L and pH = p∗H .
5.1.3 The benchmark pooling equilibrium
In the pooling equilibrium, xL = xH = 0 and pL = pH = pˆ. The price the firm
charges in the pooling equilibrium is such that for the best deviation (p∗i ) and the most
punishing belief (μ = dH ), the firm prefers pˆ. In particular, I examine the pooling equi-
librium in which the high damage firm mimics the low damage firm, that is, pˆ = p∗L .
In this case, the high damage firm can choose between p∗L and the belief μ = μ¯ or
p∗H and μ = dH . The high damage firm should prefer to play p∗L :
(V − p∗L)(p∗L − cH )
μ¯




which leads to the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 If (1−β)cH +βV ≥ cL , where β =
√
1 − μ¯dH , then there is a pooling
equilibrium in which pL = pH = p∗L and xL = xH = 0.
Proof The equilibrium has been derived above. Appendix A contains the derivation





5.2.1 Comparing the TSE with the pooling equilibrium
It is possible now to answer the first question, regarding whether cost differences
change the basic welfare conclusions of Sect. 4 for the case in which gL = dL and
gH = dH . Summarizing Proposition 3 succinctly: the EG prefers the benchmark pool-
ing equilibrium, whereas the firm prefers the separating equilibrium in which the EG
advertises. In the case with cost differences, the ex ante cost for the EG in the pooling
equilibrium is given by:
P = ρ V − cL2μ¯ dL + (1 − ρ)
V − cL
2μ¯
dH = 12 (V − cL), (32)
and the ex ante cost in the TSE is given by:









V − cL + (1 − ρ)(V − cH ) − (1 − ρ)(V − cL) dLdH
)
. (33)
Note that P ≤ T if
0 ≤ (1 − ρ)(V − cH ) − (1 − ρ)(V − cL) dLdH ⇐⇒ (V − cL)dL ≤ (V − cH )dH .
(34)
Under the assumption that cL > cH and dL < dH , this inequality holds, and the EG
prefers the pooling equilibrium over the TSE. That is, the ability to advertise hurts the
EG.
For the firm, the ex ante profit in the pooling equilibrium is:
P = ρ (V − cL)
2
4μ¯
+ (1 − ρ)(V − cL)
2 + 2(cL − cH )(V − cL)
4μ¯
, (35)
and the ex ante profit in the TSE is:
T = ρ (V − cL)
2
4dL




As the derivation in Appendix B shows T ≥ P . The welfare conclusions of Propo-
sition 3 are robust to the introduction of cost differences.
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5.2.2 Comparing TSE (EG advertises) with OSE (firm advertises)
It is obvious that the firm prefers the TSE over the OSE. Both equilibria are sepa-
rating, but in the OSE, the profit of the firm diminishes because of costly signaling.
For opposite reasons, the EG prefers the OSE over the TSE. In which equilibrium is
welfare higher though? That is, who signals most efficiently?
Welfare if the firm signals is:11
ρ
(












ρ(V − cL) − 12 (1 − ρ)(V − cH ), (37)













ρ(V − cL)− 12 (1 − ρ)(V − cH ) −
1
2










(V − pL)(pL − cL) + 12 (V − pL)












which is positive if the firm is more efficient at signaling. Note that the first term is
negative,12 and the second term is positive.
Proposition 7 The EG signals more efficiently than the firm if ρ > ρ¯ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof Note that pL is independent of ρ in the OSE and (39) is linear in ρ, positive if
ρ = 0 and negative if ρ = 1. This establishes the existence of ρ¯. 
unionsq
Therefore, the EG is more efficient only when it is likely that the product is clean, i.e.,
when the probability of advertising is low. One interpretation is that the EG is a good
channel when the problems due to the lack of information are minimal.
11 From the demand function (cf. Eq. 4) we see that consumers’ surplus equals (V − p)2/d. If the firm
charges undistorted prices, consumers’ surplus is half of profit, and welfare is 32 times profit minus the cost
of the EG. This is the case when d = dH .
12 Note that (V − pL )(pL − cL ) + 12 (V − pL )2 equals 3(V−cL )
2
8 at pL = p∗L . However pL > p∗L , and
therefore, the first term is negative.
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6 Endogenizing the choice of damage and the acquisition of information
Thus far, this study has offered little reason for an EG to provide information to the
public, whether from a social welfare viewpoint or from the viewpoint of the EG.
In this section, I investigate when the EG collects information. Therefore, the game
includes two additional prior stages. First, the firm decides to produce a low damage
good or a high damage good. I return to the assumption that there is no difference
in marginal costs between the two, but there is a (small) fixed cost K of starting to
produce the low damage good. Second, the EG chooses whether to inform itself about
the production process of the firm (at cost F). I again allow for the possibility that the
EG’s preferences for a low damage good are stronger than those of the consumers:
gH/gL ≥ dH/dL . After these choices, the game is identical to the one analyzed in
Sect. 3, but now the probability that d = dL must be consistent with the firm’s strategy
in the first period. Moreover, it is common knowledge whether the EG is informed
or not.13 An informed EG leads to an equilibrium with advertising, whereas an unin-
formed EG yields the benchmark of no advertising.
There is always an equilibrium in which the firm decides to produce a high damage
good and the EG does not get informed, because in the absence of an informed EG, the
classic market for lemons emerges, and the consumer is unable to distinguish between
low and high damage goods. Because of the fixed cost of producing the low damage
good, the firm’s profit is highest if it chooses d = dH . Because there is no uncertainty
about the firm’s damage level, there are no gains for the EG from collecting and dissem-
inating information among consumers. Its best response is not to acquire information.
It is more interesting to investigate whether there are equilibria in which the EG
does acquire information. From Proposition 3, it is obvious that two cases must be




dL+dH . In the first case, the cost of the
EG is never lower when it is informed, so there is no incentive to acquire information.
Suppose gLgH <
dL
dL+dH and the EG believes that the firm produces a low damage good
with probabilityρ. If the EG chooses to become informed, its cost will beads+F ; oth-
erwise, its cost is bench . According to Proposition 3, there exists a ρˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
ads = bench . Moreover at ρ = 1, the EG is indifferent, because μ¯ = dL and there
is no advertising. For ρ ∈ (ρˆ, 1), the cost of the EG strictly decreases if it is informed;
therefore, the EG gathers information if the cost of acquiring that information is small.
In equilibrium, the belief of the EG must be consistent with the strategy of the firm,
so the firm chooses low damage with probability ρ and high damage with probability
1 − ρ. To ensure that it is an equilibrium strategy, the firm must remain indifferent
between its two options, which can be achieved by letting the EG acquire information
with a certain probability. By the logic of mixed strategy equilibria, the EG also must
be indifferent between its two options, which means that the cost of information acqui-
sition equals the benefit of committing to advertise (when damage is high). Because
advertising is most beneficial if uncertainty about the quality of the product is greatest,
13 This assumption is common(e.g. Feddersen and Gilligan 2001), and helps avoid many technical issues. If
consumers can observe that the EG starts an investigation into the practices of the firm and the investigation
always leads the EG to conclude that a firm has either low or high damage, the assumption of common
knowledge is justified.
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but least beneficial if the product is almost certainly low or high damage, there are
two such equilibria; one with a low probability of low damage and one with a high
probability. Formally,
Proposition 8 For F > 0 and K > 0 sufficiently small, in addition to the equilibrium
in which the firm always sets high damage and the EG does not acquire information,
there exist two mixed equilibria in which
1. the EG acquires information with probability σ ∗(K ) = 4K
(V−c)2(d−1L −d−1H )
,
2. the firm sets low damage with probability ρ∗(F) ∈ {ρ(F), ρ¯(F)}, where ρ(F)
and ρ¯(F) are the two solutions to ads + F = bench,
3. ρ(0) = ρˆ and ρ is increasing in F,
4. ρ¯(0) = 1 and ρ¯ is decreasing in F.
The Pareto-superior equilibrium is the one in which ρ∗(F) = ρ¯(F). As F → 0, the
Pareto-superior equilibrium approaches the efficient outcome, in the sense that the
firm always chooses low damage and there is no advertising.
Proof See Appendix C. 
unionsq
This proposition features several caveats. Most important, the equilibria only exist
when the cost of information acquisition and the fixed cost of producing the low dam-
age good are sufficiently small, and the discrepancy between the EG’s assessment
of the environmental damage and the consumers is sufficiently high. Nevertheless,
this section shows that the threat of advertising might induce the firm to choose low
damage with high probability.
7 Conclusion
This article has investigated informative advertising by an EG when a monopolist
sells a good that causes a certain amount of damage per unit sold to the environment.
Consumers care about this damage but are unable to discern its level. Therefore, the
EG uses an advertising campaign to disseminate information about product quality.
When the firm’s level of damage is given and the EG possesses information, adver-
tising by the EG unambiguously increases the firm’s profit and consumer surplus.
However, the EG itself is unlikely to benefit. This finding naturally leads to the ques-
tion of why the EG would acquire information in the first place. If its assessment of
environmental damage is stronger than the public’s and the cost of acquiring informa-
tion is sufficiently low, there exists an equilibrium where the EG acquires information
(with some probability) and the threat of advertising causes the firm to produce a low
damage good (with some probability).
However, if the cost of acquiring information is too high, then the only equilibrium
is one in which the firm always produces a high damage good. One way to offset the
cost of acquiring information is to lower the cost of campaigning. This cost stems
from the EG’s lack of credibility, so a possible solution might be reputation building.
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Appendix A: Details Sect. 5
Preliminary remarks The objects of interest are the intervals determined by inequal-
ities of the following form:
(V − p)(p − c)
μ




where c is either cL or cH , and μ ∈ (dL , dH ). The lower and upper bound are solutions
of:




where α = μdH ∈ (0, 1). This quadratic equation in p has two real positive solutions,
namely,





OSE (firm signals) The price that the low damage firm charges is the upper bound
of the interval determined by
(V − p)(p − cH )
dL




which is equal to:
pL =





Pooling equilibrium As noted in the main text, the price the firm charges in the
pooling equilibrium is such that for the best deviation (p∗i ) and the most punishing
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belief (μ = dH ), both types prefer to play pˆ. For the low damage firm, this implies
(V − pˆ)( pˆ − cL)
μ¯




and for the high damage firm,
(V − pˆ)( pˆ − cH )
μ¯




The main text focuses on the particular pooling equilibrium in which pˆ = p∗L .
Because p∗L = V+cL2 , it is always in the interval determined by (45) and not neces-
sarily in the interval determined by (46). Because p∗L > V+cH2 , it is only necessary to
check if the upper bound implied by (46) is larger than p∗L :








(1 − √1 − α)cH + (
√
1 − α)V ≥ cL . (48)
This is a weighted average of cH and V , and a pooling equilibrium in which pˆ = p∗L
exists when the valuation for the product is high compared with the marginal cost.14
Appendix B: Details T ≥ P
It is possible to rewrite T − P as
ρ(1 − ρ)(dH − dL)(π∗L − π∗H )
μ¯




which is clearly positive under the assumption that π∗L > π∗H and ρ < 1.15 It has to be
shown that it is indeed possible to rewrite T − P in this form, which boils down
to showing that
ρ(1 − ρ)(dH − dL)(π∗L − π∗L)
μ¯
+ (1 − ρ)(cL − cH )
2
4μ¯
= ρπ∗L + (1 − ρ)π∗H −
(V − cL)2
4μ¯
− (1 − ρ)(V − cL)(cL − cH )
2μ¯
.
14 This proof generalizes to pooling equilibria, where pˆ = p∗L .
15 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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Multiplying by 4μ¯ and rearranging yields:
(V − cL)2 + (1 − ρ)(cL − cH )(2V − cL − cH )
= 4ρ[μ¯ − (1 − ρ)(dH − dL)]π∗L + 4(1 − ρ)[μ¯ + ρ(dH − dL)]π∗H .
Using the definitions of μ¯, π∗L , and π∗H , this equation simplifies to
(V −cL)2 + (1 − ρ)(cL −cH )(2V − cL −cH )=ρ(V − cL)2 + (1 − ρ)(V − cH )2.
Collecting similar terms and dividing by (1 − ρ), we obtain:
(V − cL)2 − (V − cH )2 + (cL − cH )(2V − cL − cH ) = 0.
Finally, using the identity (V −cL)2−(V −cH )2 = (V −cL+V −cH )(V −cL−V +cH )
shows that this equality always holds.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 8
Let ρ be the probability that the firm chooses low damage and σ be the probability
that the EG chooses to acquire information. As the discussion in the main text shows,
ρ should be such that the EG is indifferent between acquiring information and not
acquiring information, and σ should be such that the firm is indifferent between low
and high damage.




+ (1 − σ)(V − c)
2
4μ¯
− K . (49)








To make the firm indifferent, equate the two, which yields:
σ ∗(K ) = 4K
(V − c)2(d−1L − d−1H )
, (51)
which falls between 0 and 1 for a sufficiently small K .
To find ρ, note that the EG is indifferent between acquiring information and not
acquiring information if
ads + F = bench . (52)
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Inspecting (18) and (20), we see that this equation can be rewritten as a second-degree
polynomial in ρ. For F = 0, the two solutions are ρ = ρˆ and ρ = 1. When F is suf-
ficiently high, there is no solution. Then there exists F¯ > 0 such that for F ∈ [0, F¯],
the EG is indifferent if ρ = ρ(F) and ρ = ρ¯(F), where ρˆ ≤ ρ(F) ≤ ρ¯(F) ≤ 1. It
can be easily established that ρ(0) = ρˆ, ρ(F) is increasing in F , ρ¯(0) = 1, and ρ¯(F)
is decreasing in F .
To establish that the equilibrium in which ρ = ρ¯(F) is the Pareto-superior out-
come, it suffices to show that the EG’s expected cost is decreasing in ρ and the
firm’s expected profit is increasing in ρ. Note that the EG’s expected cost is equal to
σ(ads +F)+(1−σ)bench , which equals bench in equilibrium, because (52) holds.
It also is straightforward to verify that under the assumption that gH/gL > dH/dL ,
bench is a decreasing function of ρ. The firm’s expected profit is
σads + (1 − σ)bench − ρK = σ (V − c)
2
4dH
+ (1 − σ)bench
where the equality follows from combining (49) and (50). Only bench depends on
ρ. It is trivial to verify that bench is increasing in ρ. Therefore, the firm’s expected
profit is increasing in ρ.
As F → 0, ρ¯(F) → 1 and the firm chooses low damage almost with certainty.
Because the EG only advertises when it is informed and damage is low, this happens
with probability (1 − ρ)σ , and the probability of advertising goes to 0, which is the
same as in the efficient outcome.
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